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Abstract:
Assessors are required, as mandated by the Kentucky State Constitution and KRS
132.690, to assess property at 100 percent of fair market value. Fair market value is
defined as the price a seller would expect to receive in an open and competitive
market. Evidence from data and analysis in this paper indicates that property is
under-assessed by approximately 25 percent. Though urban areas assess at a
slightly higher rate, this is offset by rural areas, which do a significantly poorer job.
This has important implications for local communities in Kentucky that depend on
property tax revenue in order to provide necessary goods and services to residents
of those communities. Further, inaccurate property assessments distort the current
school funding formula used in Kentucky that provides state funding to schools
based on the value of properties in each school district.
Multiple econometric tests, including a rational expectation test and a hedonic price
model, are conducted to analyze the quality of PVA assessments for 199 homes
throughout Kentucky. These assessments are compared to certified appraisals for
each home, which also contain market data for 3 comparable properties. The use of
these appraisals as a proxy for fair market value is validated by econometric
analyses that show the appraised value is an unbiased estimate of the market price
of property and that appraised value is subject to only a small measurement error,
about 3.5 percent of the variance across all property values. Further, evidence
suggests that assessed values appear to be a scaled version of the unbiased appraised
values.
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Introduction:
Property taxes support communities in many ways. The collection of these taxes
is a necessary condition for a community to provide goods and services to its residents.
In order for property taxes to be collected, property must first be assessed; local
governments have given this assessment responsibility to the Property Valuation
Administrator.

The PVA, an elected official in almost all communities across the

country, is tasked with assessing all real property in a community so that community can
then, based on local property tax rates, properly collect property taxes owed by its
residents. Because the amount of taxes owed is largely a factor of the value of assessed
property, a PVA has the great responsibility of determining the correct worth of that
property.
In Kentucky, real property is to be assessed at 100 percent of its fair market value
by an elected PVA. The most current Kentucky Constitution, adopted in 1891, states
that, “All property, not exempted from taxation by this Constitution, shall be assessed for
taxation at its fair cash value, estimated at the price it would bring at a fair voluntary
sale.” According to the Jefferson County PVA website, “fair cash value” and “market
value” are to be considered synonymous.

Further, the International Association of

Assessing Officers (IAAO) in Property Appraisal and Assessment Administration states
that market value is the price a property would sell for in a competitive and open market.
The fair assessment of property in communities is a necessary function of local
government. Indeed, the public policy problem surrounding this issue is that an incorrect
assessment of residential property negatively impacts communities that depend on
accurate assessments in order to collect property taxes necessary for the county to
provide goods and services for its citizens. Should an assessor value property more than
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its fair market value, residents may seek out other communities in which to live in order
to escape what they perceive to be unfair taxes. Should an assessor value property less
than its fair market value—and forget for a moment that this is against the law—a
community loses out on needed tax revenue. Of course, a community might compensate
this potential loss of revenue due to under-assessments by raising tax rates, but raising
taxes is an often unpopular move. One might theorize that property assessments are
undervalued precisely to avoid paying higher taxes.
It should be noted that for the purposes of this paper, the terms “assessor” and
“PVA” are synonymous. In Kentucky, the PVA is the chief elected official in each
county responsible for assessing property. However, depending on the size of the PVA
office there may be other non-elected assessors employed by the PVA who assess
property in the county. The term “appraiser” refers to an individual who is hired to
conduct an official appraisal—often at the request of a homeowner—for determining the
value of a home. “Appraiser” and “assessor” are not synonymous.
Kentucky has had a property tax since 1792 and though it is an often unpopular
tax Kentucky voters have yet to demand measures such as those passed in California and
Massachusetts that would either cap property assessments at a certain percentage or cap
the percentage amount by which property taxes can be increased. Property tax revenue
remains an important source of revenue for counties.

According to the Department of

Finance for Lexington-Fayette County, revenue from property taxes exceeded $44
million dollars in FY 2006. This revenue was used to support services provided by
LexTran (Lexington’s public transit authority), garbage collection, street cleaning, the
health department, and especially the public school system.

Under the Kentucky
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Education Reform Act, state funding of local school districts is, in part, determined by
property assessments. The Support Education Excellence in Kentucky funding formula
uses the value of property assessment in counties as a variable in determining how much
funding the state will provide to each district. In short, districts with lower assessed
property values are eligible to receive more state funding than districts with higher
assessed property values. Accurate property assessments ensure that districts throughout
the state receive the funding from the state that they deserve.
The assessment process is not an exact science; though property is supposed to be
valued at fair market value, determining that value is, at times, quite difficult. After all,
how does one determine the value of a home that has not been “on the market” in many
years? How should an assessor determine the value of a home for which the value is not
easily determined?

An econometric interpretation of this question is: how much

measurement error exists in assessments? This paper estimates the measurement error
below.
There are three approaches one might use when assessing the value of a home—
the cost approach, the income approach, or the market comparison approach. The cost
approach involves determining what it would cost a homeowner to rebuild from scratch,
i.e. replacement cost. The income approach uses rental income data to value the home;
how much an owner could receive in rent is the basis for determining the home’s worth.
The most common approach, the market comparison approach, involves the use of known
market values for similar properties to determine the value of the property being assessed.
However, assessors do not use one approach—assessments typically involve the use of
some combination in an effort to accurately value a home. Properties are assessed based
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on the value of similar properties in the area, the price per square foot builders charge for
home construction, and the value of external improvements to the property and/or land.
The process by which an appraiser values a home is very similar to the process
used by a county property assessor. However, there is one key difference in the two
processes: though an assessor is not explicitly forbidden from entering a home, Kentucky
law is silent on whether an assessor has permission to inspect a home from the inside.
Thus, any improvements in the house such as a finished basement or attic would not be
captured by a property assessment but would be included in a report from an appraiser
who was allowed to enter and inspect the inside of a home. This difference is important
in understanding the research question to be discussed.

If the greater information

available to appraisers is useful, then the measurement error in appraised values is less
than the measurement error in assessed values.
Research Question:
Correct assessments of residential property—as discussed previously—are a
necessary condition for determining the property taxes owed to a community by its
residents. The purpose of this paper is to ask, “Are Property Valuation Administrators
correctly assessing residential property in counties throughout Kentucky?” Additionally,
is the difference between assessed value and appraised value consistent throughout the
state or are certain communities more at risk for assessment inequities? Are assessors
systematically under-assessing homes in their communities or is the difference between
assessed and market values essentially random variation?
To evaluate the accuracy of assessment, a “gold standard” is needed. A candidate
for this is the appraised value of a home. To examine the accuracy of this assumption,
two approaches are used in this paper. The appraised value of a home in this data set is
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not necessarily the fair market value of the property. Other factors, not measured in the
appraisal such as school districts, proximity to parks and greenspaces, help to determine
the market value of a home. These exogenous features may or may not be captured in an
appraisal or in an assessment.

To examine the appraised value, three comparable

properties valued by the market are associated with each property in the sample. If the
appraised value is an unbiased measure of market value, there should be a precise
relationship between appraised value and market value of comparable property.
Specifically, the market value should be predicted with the correct average subject to
random variation. This is tested below. Second, the variation in market values of
comparable properties is a measure of the uncertainty, or technically measurement error,
of the appraised value. This can be used to estimate any impact of measurement error on
the statistical estimation.
Even if the appraised value of a home does not represent the full fair market
value, it is a better indicator of the market than the assessed value for two reasons—
because local governments indicate that this is their belief and because there are
difficulties with assessing property at 100 percent of fair market value. Through my
work as a research assistant with the Hazard Mitigation Grant Project, I have encountered
many grant applications for FEMA-sponsored home acquisition projects from local
communities where a “multiplier” has been added by the community onto the official
PVA assessment in order to arrive at the fair market value (see Appendix 1). In effect,
these communities are indicating by their actions that their local PVA is not assessing
property at 100 percent of the fair market value, as required by law.
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But it is possible that it is quite difficult for a county PVA to accurately assess
properties at the legally required limit. Fair and accurate assessments depend on a full
range of market data. After all, if an assessor is using the market comparison approach
and there is no market to compare the home to, how can an assessor know the fair value
of a home? And, as one PVA admitted, “In the end, you don’t know the market value of
a home until it’s sold.” This implies that assessments could not be perfect but does not
imply that they must be under-assessed.
Besides the current Kentucky State Constitution, Kentucky Revised Statute
132.690 requires that each property parcel be assessed annually—at fair market value—
and visually inspected at least once within a 4 year period. But in 1965, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals found that on average real property in the state was being assessed
between 12.5 percent and 33 percent of its fair market value and ruled that in accordance
with the State Constitution, real property must be assessed at 100 percent of the fair
market value. The Court found, “It is not only admitted but has become a matter of
common knowledge that real estate and tangible personal property in Kentucky are
assessed for tax purposes at varying percentages substantially less than 100 percent of
fair cash value” (Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W. 2d 694; 1965). It is probable that
homeowners throughout the state are aware of past under-assessments. Bringing these
assessments up to fair market value would then, be quite difficult. Any unexpected
increase in an assessment could possibly create voter unrest and assessment appeals.
Essentially, the entrenched system of under-assessment is the known problem with
assessing at 100 percent of fair market value.
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Again, the purpose of this paper is to analyze property assessments from homes
throughout the Commonwealth and compare those assessments to appraisals for those
homes in order to determine if real property is being under-assessed throughout the
Commonwealth and if so, by how much. In addition, appraisals are compared to market
values to provide evidence of whether appraisals are sufficiently accurate to be used as a
standard.
Unit of Analysis:
The units of analysis for the purposes of this study are individual residential
properties across Kentucky. Specifically, the properties in the data set are homes that
have sustained flood damage or are at high-risk for sustaining flood damage and have
either been acquired by the communities in which they are located using FEMA funds or
have been identified as possible acquisition projects using FEMA funds in the future.
When applying for mitigation funds from FEMA for acquisition projects, communities
are required to submit proposed budgets, which include the estimated cost for purchasing
the properties in the project from the homeowners.

To derive this estimated cost,

applicants generally submit the most current PVA assessment for the property. When a
project is approved and funds are to be dispersed, FEMA requires that the applicant
conduct an official appraisal—using a licensed appraiser—before purchasing the
property. It is this appraised value, and not the assessed value, that FEMA uses as the
offer price to homeowners.

The data set consists of 199 properties targeted for

acquisition between 1997 and 2005. The data sets include homes of various size, age,
and value that are from urban, suburban, and rural areas. Although not every county is
represented in the data set, all regions of the state are represented. It is possible that the
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sample of homes in floodplains identified as a target for acquisition and demolition
differs from homes in Kentucky otherwise, but such a difference would have to affect the
relationship between assessor and appraiser behavior to affect this research.
Methodology:
The simplest statistical test to determine if the appraised values for the homes in
the data set are significantly different than the assessed value is to conduct a group means
comparison test. In this test, Ho is that the difference of means is zero, meaning that there
is no difference between the means of the two groups. However, little analysis can be
gained from this statistical test. Regression analyses are conducted using the appraised
values and assessed values of the homes. In these regressions, other characteristics of the
properties will be controlled to determine not only how the assessments differ from the
appraisals but how they differ across areas of the state. Additionally, because certain
characteristics of the homes are used to determine the value of that home a hedonic price
model will be constructed using those characteristics of the properties cited by property
assessors as important characteristics in their assessments.
To examine the validity of the appraised value as a measure of market value as
mandated by the constitution, a regression is estimated to test whether appraised value is
an unbiased estimator of the average market value of three comparable properties. To
estimate the measurement error of appraised value, the variance of the three market
values is calculated, subject to the hypothesis of unbiased estimation not being rejected.
All statistical tests are performed using Stata, Version 9.0
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Literature Review:
Previous research on this issue has tended to focus on three main areas: the
quality of assessments, the need for frequent assessments, and the quality and
professionalism of assessors.
Gillen (2002) has commented on the need for quality assessments, noting that
because the housing market is not as liquid as other markets it is difficult to observe
actual market values. But, although the process is not an exact science, the goal of
property assessors should be to avoid any systematic errors in assessments. As Strauss
and Strauss (2003) note, “Where there is uniformity in assessments, our confidence in the
tax collection process increases. Many would likely be willing to pay a bit more tax if
they knew that greater uniformity in administration of the local real estate tax would
result” (2). It could be argued that the inequity—vertical and horizontal—present in the
property assessment process is responsible for the unpopularity of the property tax. After
all, a homeowner is more likely to have negative views of the property tax if he believes
that he has been assessed more than his neighbor who has a similar home. There is much
debate as to whether the property tax is progressive (meaning that those with higher
incomes pay more tax), regressive (those with lower incomes pay more tax), or
proportional (all income levels pay the same percentage of their income). Demusaj
(2003) notes, “Despite the fact that the property tax is a major source of revenue for
many localities, ubiquitous and unequivocal consensus does not exist on the issue of
whether property taxes are progressive, regressive, or proportional” (6). Though the
debate is yet unsettled regarding the equity of the property tax in theory, inaccurate
assessments tend to create a tax system that is skewed regressively. Gillen (2002),
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Mikesell (1978), and Engle (1975) all point out that inaccuracies in the assessment
process tend to create a property tax system that is regressive. Engle’s (1975) argument
for a de facto regressive property tax is that lower-income neighborhoods tend to have
slow rates of increase in property values and that property assessments rarely change.
But, another argument for a de facto regressive property tax can be made. Those with
higher incomes are likely more aware of the value of not only their home but of the value
of their neighbors’ homes as well. Any perceived inaccuracy in a property assessment is
almost certain to bring about an appeal, a process that for the assessor’s office is both
costly and time consuming, as mentioned by Gillen (2002).
But improprieties in the assessment—at least deliberate improprieties—may not
solely be responsible for a regressive tax system. It is possible, as shown by McMillen
and Weber (2006) that thin property markets may be at fault. They write, “In a slow
market with few sales, relevant information cannot be incorporated quickly into either a
property’s market price or, by association, its assessed valuation” (3). McMillen and
Weber (2006) conclude that it is strongly suggestive that thick property markets are
associated with more accurate property assessments.
The frequency of property assessments is important when discussing the
perceived fairness of the property tax system.

As noted above, if assessments are

infrequent and unchanging, those with rising property values pay proportionally less than
do those living in neighborhoods with stagnant property values.

But infrequent

assessments also benefit infrequent movers. As stated by Strumpf (1999), “Assessed
values, as well as property tax payments, are inversely proportional to home tenure”
(170). Besides vertical and horizontal inequity, infrequent assessments also distort the
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socially optimum tax level.

Strumpf (1999) notes that long lags between property

assessments lead to lower tax revenue for a community, which can only be recovered
either by reassessments or a higher tax rate. Stine (2005) theorizes that rational local
governments shorten this lag time between reassessments in order to generate more
revenue with a lower mill rate. This is especially important in states with caps on
property tax rates, such as California and Massachusetts. Stine writes, “property tax
limits are intended to restrict local governments from raising local tax rates. However,
the evidence from this study showed they [tax limits] were avoided…by increasing the
assessment ration which usually was substantially below its legal limit” (2404).
Kentucky statute requires an annual assessment, with an on-site inspection (which could
be termed a reassessment) at least once within a four year period.
The accuracy of an assessment depends on two factors: the frequency by which
that assessment is done and the professionalism and quality of the assessor. As Borland
(1990) writes, the degree of inequity is related to “assessing procedures, neighborhood
characteristics, characteristics of the assessor and difficulty of the task, the frequency of
reassessments, and more recently, to the property tax rate itself” (431, emphasis added).
It is often believed, as Bowman and Mikesell (1989) note, that the property assessment
process is inherently flawed because assessors are elected rather than appointed.
However, they find that in Virginia—a state that has both elected and appointed
assessors—the quality of assessments does not depend on the method by which the
assessor is selected. Strauss and Sullivan (1998) state that communities ought to replace
appointed assessors with elected assessors if they are seeking to improve the quality of
assessments. This may be surprising to some who believe that elected assessors have a
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political interest in under-assessing property in their jurisdiction.

Further, county

assessors do a much better job than do local (i.e., city or town) assessors. Though no
reason is given in the literature as to why this is true, one could suggest that a local
assessor can be too involved in the day-to-day happenings of his neighbors, whereas a
county assessor can be insulated politically. If, then, appointing assessors rather than
electing them does not improve the quality of property assessments, what can be done to
improve the quality of assessors and subsequently the quality of assessments? Bowman
and Mikesell (1989) argue for contracting assessor services—presumably with certified
appraisers, though they do not specify. They write, “Contracting appears empirically as
well as logically, to provide professionalization’s benefits without the local assessor’s
office being staffed by person meeting the usual professionalism standards” (186).
Additionally, the state has a role to play. Strauss and Sullivan (1998) argue that state
establishment and enforcement of assessment standards is necessary, which includes
assessor standards.

Further, prohibiting “right of entry” is related to lower quality

assessments. As noted before, Kentucky statute is silent on this issue.
Analysis of Data:
A group means comparison test indicates that the mean for assessed value and the
mean for appraised value are statistically different. In the data set, the mean for assessed
value is $40,907 while the mean for appraised value is $58,901. As shown in Table 1,
with a t-value of -5.41, the null hypothesis that the means are not different can be
rejected. This is significant at the .01 level. This reveals only that the mean values of the
data set are statistically significantly different. From that, we can state that the assessed
value and the appraised value are different.
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Table 1
Two-sample t test with equal variances
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Err.

assedvalue
appedvalue

199
199

40906.63
58901.01

combined

398

49903.82

diff

-17994.38

Std. Dev.

[95% Conf. Interval]

2116.047
2562.828

29850.51
36153.13

36733.75 45079.51
53847.06 63954.95

1719.995

34313.79

46522.38

3323.513

53285.25

-24528.31 -11460.44

diff = mean(assedvalue) - mean(appedvalue)
t = -5.4143
Ho: diff = 0
degrees of freedom =
396
Ha: diff < 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0000

Ha: diff != 0
Ha: diff > 0
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000
Pr(T > t) = 1.0000

A test of unbiased prediction of a variable y, such as assessed value, by a variable
x, such as appraised value, is carried out by regressing y on x with a constant term and
testing the joint hypothesis that the constant is 0 and the slope 1, i.e. that y = 0 + 1x +
random variation, represented as an error term ε. The slope of unity would assure that y
is just x with random noise, and the constant of 0 would assure that the level is not
adjusted absolutely up or down. An F-test is used for this joint hypothesis test. The Fstatistic is highly statistically significant. Below, this idea is used again to examine
whether appraised values provide unbiased estimates of market values.
What happens if assessed value is regressed onto appraised value? If—and we
know this is not the situation because of the group means comparison test conducted
previously—assessed value and appraised value were not statistically different, then the
coefficient for appraised value would be 1, indicating that the assessed value was 100
percent of the appraised value. Instead, this regression reveals a coefficient of .7558,
meaning that the assessed value is 75 percent of the appraised value. In other words, if
the appraised value is a proxy for the full fair market value, then assessors are under-
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valuing homes by 25 percent in the data set. In addition, the estimated constant of -3612
indicates that assessed values are also adjusted absolutely downward. The hypothesis of
unbiased assessment is rejected with very large F statistic (p<0.0001). Table 2 shows the
Stata output for this regression with relevant R2, t-values, and F-values.
Table 2
y = 0 + 1x + random variation, represented as an error term ε
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

1.4784e+11 1
2.8586e+10 197

1.4784e+11
145107824

Total

1.7643e+11 198

891053108

assedvalue
appedvalue
cons

Coef.
.7558242
-3612.175

Std. Err.
.0236792
1635.375

t
31.92
-2.21

Number of obs = 199
F( 1, 197) = 1018.84
Prob > F
= 0.0000
R-squared = 0.8380
Adj R-squared = 0.8372
Root MSE
= 12046

P>|t|
0.000
0.028

[95% Conf. Interval]
.7091269 .8025214
-6837.264 -387.0858

This regression can be expanded further, controlling for both urban and rural
areas. Rural areas are defined as cities with populations less than 20,000, while urban
areas are considered cities with populations greater than 20,000. In this regression, the
coefficient for appraised value becomes .7570. Again, urban areas in the data set assess
their properties at 75 percent of the fair market value. However, rural areas do not do so
well in assessing properties at their market value.

When only rural properties are

regressed, the coefficient for appraised value is .6987; rural PVAs assess properties
approximately 30 percent below their fair market value. Tables 3 and 4 show the relevant
Stata output.

The constant terms are statistically insignificant in these regressions,

indicating the statistically significant constant in the combined regression could have
resulted from combining the samples, not from appraiser practice. Both urban and rural
assessors appear to scale down appraised values, but at different average rates.
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Table 3
y = 0 + 1x + random variation, represented as an error term ε if urban =1
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual|

7.7622e+10 1
1.3114e+10 85

7.7622e+10
154286645

Total

9.0737e+10 86

1.0551e+09

assedvalue
appedvalue
cons

Coef.

Std. Err.

.7569824 .0337486
-2428.157 2944.878

t

Number of obs =
87
F( 1, 85) = 503.11
Prob > F
= 0.0000
R-squared = 0.8555
Adj R-squared = 0.8538
Root MSE
= 12421

P>|t|

22.43
-0.82

[95% Conf. Interval]

0.000
0.412

.6898811 .8240837
-8283.362 3427.049

Table 4
y = 0 + 1x + random variation, represented as an error term ε if urban =0
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

3.3174e+10 1
1.4999e+10 110

3.3174e+10
136351710

Total

4.8173e+10 111

433987717

assedvalue

Coef.

appedvalue
cons

.698664
-2075.494

Std. Err.
.044792
2266.472

Number of obs = 112
F( 1, 110) = 243.30
Prob > F
= 0.0000
R-squared = 0.6886
Adj R-squared = 0.6858
Root MSE
= 11677

t

P>|t|

15.60
-0.92

0.000
0.362

[95% Conf. Interval]
.6098968 .7874311
-6567.109 2416.121

In the above tests, urban areas and rural areas were analyzed separately. Similar
conclusions can be reached by using all observations and including a dummy variable
“urban” along with an interaction variable uapped (urban times appraised value). The
variable “urban” is a dummy variable with “1” representing an urban location and “0”
representing a rural location. The interaction variable represents appraisals in urban
areas. In the regression model, we have y = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 +β3x3 + ε, where x1 = the
appraised value of the home, x2 = the dummy variable “urban” with “urban” =1 if in an
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urban location, and x3 = the interaction variable “uapped” indicating the appraisal of a
home in an urban area. Table 5 contains the relevant Stata output for this model. In the
model, we have significant coefficients on the variables “appedvalue” and “uapped.”
Those coefficients are .6469 and .1101, respectively, indicating that a home is assessed at
approximately 65 percent of its fair market value with an urban assessment being worth
an additional 11 percent. This is similar to what was found earlier using only urban areas
in the regression; in that model, the estimated coefficient was .7570. Again, urban
assessments are much closer to revealing the true fair market value of a home than are
assessments conducted in rural areas of the Commonwealth.
Table 5

y = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 +β3x3 + ε
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

1.5259e+11
2.6995e+10

3
197

5.0862e+10
137029576

Total

1.7958e+11

200

897909505

assedvalue

Coef.

Std. Err.

appedvalue
urban
uapped
cons

.6468708
-2081.429
.1101115
-346.7279

.0400143
3471.045
.0511147
2084.672

Number of obs = 199
F( 3, 197) = 371.18
Prob > F
= 0.0000
R-squared = 0.8497
Adj R-squared = 0.8474
Root MSE
= 11706

t

P>|t|

16.17
-0.60
2.15
-0.17

0.000
0.549
0.032
0.868

[95% Conf. Interval]
.5679595 .7257821
-8926.605 4763.747
.0093092 .2109139
-4457.865 3764.41

Assessors—and appraisers—indicate that certain characteristics of the home are
important when estimating the market value of a home. Indeed, as previously mentioned,
characteristics such as the size of the home (as measured by square feet), the number of
bathrooms and bedrooms, and the age of the home are the primary characteristics
analyzed when determining a home’s worth. Thus, we can estimate the value of the
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properties in the data set using a hedonic price model and regressing assessed value on
those characteristics known to be important to property assessors. The model becomes
y = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x3 + β4x4 + β4x4 + ε, with x1 = the variable “sqft” representing the
size of the house measure by square feet; x2 = the variable “bedrooms” representing the
number of bedrooms in the home; x3 = the variable “bathrooms” indicating the number of
bathrooms in the home; and x4 = the variable “age” for the age of the home. The “y”
variable is assessed value.

The model indicates that of those four variables, only

bedrooms in not a significant coefficient. Table 6 details the relevant Stata output. As
we can see, on average each additional square foot of living space adds an additional
$17.53 to the value of a home. Further, each additional bathroom is worth an additional
$11,197. That this variable is statistically significant and the variable “bedrooms” is not
statistically significant is not surprising. The coefficient for “age” is negative, which is
also not surprising. Though there may be value in historic neighborhoods and older
homes, there is the possibility that older homes are in stagnant and deteriorating
neighborhoods, which would lower the value of the home.
Table 6

y = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 +β3x3 + ε
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
3.9094e+10 4
Residual 1.3733e+11 194

9.7735e+09
707910066

Total

891053108

1.7643e+11 198

assedvalue
sqft
bedrooms
bathrooms
age
cons

Coef.
17.53325
2068.238
11196.52
-274.9943
9241.42

Std. Err.
6.475086
2921.197
5113.417
106.1173
8811.886

t
2.71
0.71
2.19
-2.59
1.05

Number of obs = 199
F( 4, 194) = 13.81
Prob > F
= 0.0000
R-squared = 0.2216
Adj R-squared = 0.2055
Root MSE
= 26607

P>|t|
0.007
0.480
0.030
0.010
0.296

[95% Conf. Interval]
4.762645
-3693.143
1111.491
-484.286
-8137.976

30.30385
7829.62
21281.55
-65.70249
26620.82
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The hedonic model estimates what determines the market value of a house.
Inserting into the same hedonic model the variable appedvalue (appraised value) tests a
different hypothesis. If assessed values are scaled versions of appraised values, then
conditional on appraised value, characteristics of homes should not matter. If assessors,
in contrast, value specific features of homes differently from the market, then those
features predict differences between assessed and appraised values. If the coefficient for
appraised value is not capturing assessor behavior toward those home characteristics,
then the coefficients for “sqft”, “bedrooms”, “bathrooms”, and “age” should remain
significant.

As shown in Table 7, when regressing assessed value onto the home

characteristic variables and the appraised value of the home, the only coefficient that is
significant is the one associated with the appraised value of the home; the others are
individually and jointly statistically insignificant. This implies that assessors scale down
the market value on average without adjusting for specific characteristics.
Table 7

y = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 +β3x3 + β4x4 + ε
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

1.4814e+11
2.8292e+10

5
193

2.9627e+10
146588429

Total

1.7643e+11

198

891053108

assedvalue
sqft
bedrooms
bathrooms
age
appedvalue
cons

Coef.
-.4178954
386.0561
-1277.407
58.92013
.7709786
-5683.476

Std. Err.

t

P>|t|

3.019115
1330.726
2371.391
49.81672
.0282679
4047.031

-0.14
0.29
-0.54
1.18
27.27
-1.40

0.890
0.772
0.591
0.238
0.000
0.162

Number of obs = 199
F( 5, 193) = 202.11
Prob > F
= 0.0000
R-squared = 0.8396
Adj R-squared = 0.8355
Root MSE
= 12107

[95% Conf. Interval]
-6.372591 5.536801
-2238.577 3010.689
-5954.577 3399.763
-39.33497 157.1752
.715225 .8267323
-13665.56 2298.612
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We can expand these models further by including dummy variables for the
different foundations of the homes in the data set—poured concrete, mobile home, or
another foundation type. Adding the dummy variables for foundation types does not
change the significance of the other variables—size of the home, age, and number of
bathroom remain statistically significant. However, only “mobile” is significant of the
foundation-type variables. A mobile home reduces the hedonic value of a property
assessment by approximately $33,632.42. However, there is no change to the conclusion
that assessors scale down the market value with no reference to specific characteristics,
including foundation and mobile home.
All of this presumes that appraised value is in fact a valid measure of fair market
value. If it is not, none of the conclusions are useful, and if it is measured with error,
then the coefficients on it are biased toward zero, biasing such estimates as the 75 percent
ratio of assessed to appraised value toward zero, making interpretation of assessor
behavior impossible.
To evaluate the appraised value directly, the average market value of three
comparable properties is regressed on appraised value. This expected value model is
similar to the one above where assessed value was regressed on appraised value. As
before, a constant of zero and a slope of unity subject to sampling error is the relevant
joint hypothesis. Table 8 shows the relevant Stata output. The estimates show a constant
of 2337 (t-value of 0.72) and a slope of 0.9825 (standard error of 0.0472), both
individually and jointly insignificantly different from the hypothetical values (p<0.69).
So the appraised value appears to be an unbiased estimator of the market value of
comparable properties.
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Table 8
y = 0 + 1x + random variation, represented as an error term ε
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

2.4981e+11 1
1.1359e+11 197

2.4981e+11
576605081

Total

3.6340e+11 198

1.8354e+09

Coef.

Std. Err.

avgappval
appedvalue
cons

.9824927
2337.457

.047202
3259.952

Number of obs = 199
F( 1, 197) = 433.25
Prob > F
= 0.0000
R-squared = 0.6874
Adj R-squared = 0.6858
Root MSE
= 24013

t
20.81
0.72

P>|t|

[95% Conf. Interval]

0.000
0.474

.8894066 1.075579
-4091.426 8766.34

It is still possible that there could be measurement error, but that can be measured
directly using the three comparable properties. The standard deviation of appraised
values is 36153. The average standard deviation of measurement error across these 199
properties is 6897, less than one fifth of 36153. The variance of measurement error is the
square of the ratio of standard deviations, 3.5 percent of the variance of appraised values.
This implies that the downward bias in regression-estimated relationship between
assessed and appraised values is similar, 3.5 percent. For example, a coefficient of 0.7
might have been 0.7245 (i.e. 0.7 times 1.035) without any measurement error. Such a
small measurement error changes no qualitative conclusions or comparisons in this paper.
Appraised value is an appropriate standard against which to compare assessed value.

Conclusion:
Based on the data set available, it appears as though property assessors throughout
Kentucky are under-assessing residential property, on average, by approximately 25
percent. The Kentucky State Constitution, as well as KRS 132.690 explicitly state that
all real property must be assessed at 100 percent of its fair market value, which in this
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data set is represented by the appraisal value. Various econometric tests confirm that this
value is, indeed, a good measure of the fair market value. Therefore, the properties in the
data set—at the time of their assessment—were not assessed at their full fair market
value, in violation of the law.

Additionally, econometrical testing indicates that

properties in rural areas are assessed at a much lower rate (69 percent of fair market
value) than the entire data set while urban properties are assessed at a higher rate
(approximately 78 percent of fair market value).
Based on available evidence, it also appears as though the assessors in this data
set are aware of the fair market value and are scaling back the assessments, as indicated
by a hedonic price model constructed with relevant property characteristics used by
property assessors to assess residential property.
It is possible to theorize why the data indicates the results above. First, it is
important to note that property assessment is not an exact science, especially in thin
markets with little available comparison data. This is a possible explanation for the
difference is assessment quality between rural and urban areas. But assessor quality is
also a potential factor. It is the belief of at least one Kentucky PVA that many PVAs
throughout the state are not qualified and lack the necessary skills to accurately value
properties. Whether this is true or not is not known, but it is probable that PVA offices in
more populated areas have larger staffs and budgets. If money, or a lack thereof, is
correlated with assessment quality it is likely that this perception is only seemingly true
because larger offices can afford better training for the assessors. One possible solution
that has potential for success is to supplement PVA assessments with private appraisals,
an approach argued by Bowman and Mikesell (1989). This could help alleviate the
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difficulty with not only thin markets but may increase the perception of professionalism
in some PVA offices. It should be noted that because not all Kentucky counties are
represented in this data set and because this data set includes properties which may or
may not be representative of the housing population throughout the Commonwealth,
more study is indeed needed on this issue.
It is, however, troubling that the data does indicate some assessor knowledge of
the full fair market value.

It makes one wonder if assessors are not scaling back

assessments in order to avoid the costly and time consuming appeals process, seemingly
knowing that assessing at 75 percent of market value is the limit beyond which property
owners are more likely to appeal. It is also possible, though great care has been taken to
avoid much discussion of politics in this study, that assessors are worried about their reelectability.

Kentucky PVAs are elected in each county; it is within the realm of

possibility that under-assessment occurs not only to avoid the costly appeals process but
that by avoiding the appeals process the electorate is not dissatisfied with the job
performance of the PVA. However, it is difficult to know how much, if any, politics
influences the property assessment process. Again, more study of this issue is necessary.
Inaccurate property assessments can distort the property tax system, creating
inequities both horizontally and vertically. Horizontal inequity is created if two similar
properties are assessed at a different value. Vertical inequity is created if the assessments
are under-assessed more for higher income properties than for lower income properties.
A property tax system that is perceived as being fair and equitable is necessary for the
function of local governments. A property assessment process that values properties at
their full fair market value is the basis for this property tax system. Though current
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evidence indicates that assessors are not valuing property at 100 percent of their fair
market value, as required by law, is it important to mention that in 1965 the Kentucky
Court of Appeals found that properties were, on average, being assessed between 12.5
percent and 33 percent of their fair market value. Though the evidence indicates that
assessment quality is improving, there also remains room for further improvement.
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Appendix 1:
Proposed budget submitted by Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government for a
FEMA grant project in 1998 to buy floodprone homes. Note the columns indicating PVA
assessment value and the 20 percent multiplier to bring the value up to fair market value.
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